Senate Committee says S.S.B. members must go
It was established in September of 2004 and in the ensuing twenty-two months the Senate Select Committee investigating the Social Security Board’s ill-fated mortgage securitisation programme has gone about its work with quiet determination. Today it presented its one hundred twenty-four page report to the full Senate, from where it will be sent to the Prime Minister. And while protocol dictates that it not be made public before it reaches the P.M.’s desk, today’s Senate debate made it clear that the blame for millions of dollars in losses of public funds is shared by board members, members of the investment committee, board employees and unscrupulous high level operatives who seemed to enjoy a very special relationship with the Belize government. Tonight’s coverage of the report consists solely of excerpts from the debate, which did not end until less than an hour ago. We open with a short clip from the address of government appointed Senator Dickie Bradley, but from there we turn at length to the remarks of Senator Godwin Hulse. Hulse, representing the private sector, is the committee’s chairman … and it is clear that he was the driving force behind what can only be described as an historic investigation.
Richard Bradley, Leader of Government Business
?It could have been prevented. Had the checks been made. Had someone driven from Belmopan to San Ignacio right alongside a tower that stands as a monument to the negligence, it could have been prevented. And what this recommendation does is say to the Prime Minister of the country, who at this particular conjuncture is responsibLE for Social Security Board that this is the considered findings of the committee that you appointed in September of 2004. Let it not be, oh they just said this, for this is a serious recommendation that all those involved must leave. It is a very serious matter. It continues on page one hundred and twenty-one that the Senate Committee is of the view that the information contained in the report in respect to the documents covering: Data-Pro, Aquarius, Western Caribbean, International Telecoms and the two other mortgages which were signed and contained representations and warranties and other statements that is or may be misleading, false or deceptive, that these things could amount to offences under the criminal code of this country. And in particular section twenty, section one fifty-three, section one sixty-four and section one sixty-five. This committee therefore recommends that the Director of Public Prosecution be handed the information i.e. this copy of this report and all the relevant matters in the files and that it is his responsibility to pursue this matter. That again Mr. President, I?m reporting to you and members of the Senate, who have asked us to form a committee on their behalf, is not a light recommendation. It is a serious recommendation for members of the legislature having looked at a situation, and to come to such a conclusion. The last paragraph there on Mr. President is that the committee is of the view of the issuance of two insurance certificates, the details of course are in the report itself. There was an issue of two insurance certificates which were issued that those insurance certificates appear to be in breach of the insurance law. And we have asked again that that matter be turned over to the Director of Public Prosecution.?
Senator Godwin Hulse, Chairman, Senate Select Committee
?We looked at how your money was managed at the Social Security, and we will report to you on how that was managed. I am sure Senator Gomez representing the unions will be of a similar vein. Mr. President, I want to say that I found it throughout this process, this arduous and very tedious process of investigating. I found it from time to time appalling if not unbelievable. How an organisation as large as the Social Security, an organisation with the calibre of professionals at the Social Security, accountants at their disposal, lawyers on retention and people who are well qualified could have found themselves in this situation. Indeed Mr. President, I still do not have an answer. As you go through the report, and the members of the honourable Senate I want you to bear in mind that, because there are many instances as highlighted in the report. And there are many instances, where Social Security exercised absolute and impeccable care and due diligence in dealing with mortgages and in dealing with situations involving the fund. And that dichotomy I have not been able to resolve. But what I am sure of, unequivocally sure of is that the people at Social Security understood, understand now and will understand in the future how mortgages are to be handled.?
?Mr. President that was the crux of our dilemma, not so much the securitization and the selling on the foreign market, because it no matter if you sold the mortgage or if you didn?t sell the mortgage it mattered that you ensured that one, you had good collateral. Two a good loan, a customer that had repayability characteristics. That it was not going to expose your fund. That in the event of a default as happens in business from time to time there was recourse, and that formula is imbedded in the Social Security investment guidelines. Of which you yourself, Mr. President was well familiar with for you sat as a member of that investment committee, those were imbedded in the guidelines. It did not matter if that was Ms. Jane five dollars or St. James fifty million dollars that process was the same. And so when we looked at all of this in its entirety we began to see a pattern emerging, a disturbing pattern. And when we had persons before us and we asked them if they could say to us, did you have any instructions from persons a or b, to be direct ministers and so forth, the response was always no. Yet we could not understand why when the investment committee, the committee on which you sat Mr. President, from time to time signalled caution and signalled caution. And without being presumptuous, I would dare to suggest that many times those cautions may have emanated from your esteemed self as an attorney, be careful, those cautions were tossed to the wind. We have highlighted those in this report, tossed to the wind. In the case of two specific mortgages, the two that created the maximum problem for the Social Security you said no, what part of no do you not understand? You said do not get involved! Not you may get involved! You may consider again the Social Security Investment Committee was set up as a high level technical committee with capable people to peruse the applications for investments and direct the board. Now I know the piece of legislation, I think it is section forty-six has been floating around from time to time between successive governments and sometimes the committee was to advise and as soon as government changed it was appealed to direct then government changed again and then it was subsequent changed to direct, and at the time you sat Mr. President it was to direct.”
“Every time it would appear that an issue came surrounding mortgages to be securitized from St. James the Social Security people dealt with it, in what I would term and you will not find this term in the report, in a very nonchalant cavalier manner. We all know Mr. President how the Social Security guards its fund, and if you are having a baby it?s like pulling teeth to get your three hundred plus or whatever dollars it is. And these may be the times when Senator Bradley may say Senator Hulse contain your emotion, but I find it difficult to contain when just over a year and eight months ago I had to sit and stand and accompany an esteemed colleague of mine in the business committee, a productive, a progressive Belizean. The late Alger Bradley of Toucan Match, when I accompanied him to the Appeals Board to try to get his due to pay for his cancer which was eating away at his brain, and we failed. We argued the case with tooth and nail before medical professionals and we failed, and he died. The funds he required perhaps to give him little more life was late in coming and never came, although he was given subsequently an ex gratia payment, but here was a man who contributed from 1981. And when these loans came forward Mr. President in the flash of a flash we had seven million, nine million. When you in the investment committee said no, and Mr. President it?s a concept I could never reconcile.?
